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Abstract
This paper develops an endogenous default risk model for small open economies that in-
teract with risk averse international investors whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). By incorporating risk averse investors who trade with an emerging
economy, the present model explains a larger proportion and volatility of the spread between
sovereign bonds and riskless assets than the standard model with risk neutral investors. The
paper shows that if investors have DARA preferences, then the emerging economy’s default
risk, capital flows, and bond prices are a function not only of the fundamentals of the econ-
omy but also of the level of financial wealth and risk aversion of international investors. In
particular, as investors become wealthier or less risk averse, the emerging economy becomes
less credit constrained. As a result, the emerging economy’s default risk is lower, and its
bond prices and capital inflows are higher. Additionally, with risk averse investors, the
risk premium in the asset prices of the sovereign countries can be decomposed into two
components: a base premium that compensates the investors for the probability of default
and an “excess” premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default.
Keywords: Sovereign Default, International Investors, Risk Aversion.
JEL Classification: F32; F34; F36
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1 Introduction
In the literature on endogenous sovereign default risk, it is widely recognized that there is a
strong relation between the domestic fundamentals of emerging economies and their access
to international credit markets.1 However, this literature has not considered (endogenously)
the effect of investors’ characteristics, such as their risk aversion and financial performance.
Empirically, investors’ characteristics and sovereign bond prices are correlated: according
to the empirical literature, investors’ characteristics have the potential to affect the cost
of external financing available for emerging economies as much as country specific funda-
mentals.2 The current paper endogenizes this link. The purpose of the paper is to present
a model that analyzes the importance of investors’ characteristics in the determination of
endogenous sovereign risk, interest rates, and capital inflows of emerging economies.
In reviewing the recent empirical literature on investors’ characteristics and the deter-
mination of sovereign bond spreads and capital inflows to emerging economies, five styl-
ized facts emerge which have not been accounted for by previous literature in endogenous
sovereign risk:
(i) Emerging economies’ estimated default probabilities do not account for all of the
spreads in their sovereign bonds.
(ii) The risk premium (i.e. the part of the spread that is not accounted for by the expected
losses from default) is higher for riskier countries, and it is larger for periods of crisis.
That this premium is larger in periods of turmoil implies that the risk premium is
counter-cyclical.
(iii) Investors’ financial performance and their net foreign asset position in emerging
economies are positively correlated. Additionally, investors’ financial performance
and emerging economies’ sovereign spreads are negatively correlated.
(iv) Emerging economies’ credit spreads are positively correlated with spreads of corporate
junk bonds from developed countries, which in the empirical literature are used as a
proxy for investors attitude towards risk (referred to also as global risk aversion).
(v) Sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies’ are highly correlated.
1See for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2008),
Cuadra and Sapriza(2008), Mendoza and Yue (2011), and Bai and Zhang (2012).
2See for example FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Ferruci et al. (2004), Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2005),
Remolona et al.(2007), Gonza´lez and Levy Yeyati (2008), Broner et al.(2010) and Longstaff et al. (2011).
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These stylized facts have not been accounted for by previous models in endogenous
sovereign risk because they are not qualitatively consistent – and therefore cannot be quan-
titatively consistent – with models of endogenous default risk that have risk neutral in-
vestors.
If international investors in emerging economies are risk neutral, the spreads of the
bonds of those economies should be explained only by the expected losses from default
(i.e., by the default probabilities of the countries). In such case there is no additional risk
premium. This situation is clearly inconsistent with stylized facts (i) and (ii).
Having risk neutral investors is also inconsistent with facts (iii) to (v): In models with
risk neutral investors, emerging economies’ default probabilities are determined by the
economies’ fundamentals and/or the beliefs of the investors regarding the default/repayment
decision of the government given those fundamentals3. As a consequence, in those models
neither investors’ wealth nor risk appetite matter for the determination of the spreads and
the capital inflows to the emerging economies, and they cannot be consistent with facts
(iii) to (iv). Furthermore, in models with risk neutral investors, there cannot be an en-
dogenous link between different emerging economies that allows their spreads to be highly
correlated since investors’ portfolio allocations to different countries depend only on the
country specific risk assessment.
The current paper presents an alternative model of endogenous sovereign default risk
that is qualitatively consistent with the previous cited facts, and that can account quan-
titatively for facts (i) through (iii).4 This model departs from the previous literature by
considering international investors that are risk averse and whose preferences exhibit de-
creasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).5
3See Cole and Kehoe (2000) for a model of endogenous default risk with risk neutral investors where
fundamentals of the economy can be relatively sound and default still might occur
4Quantitatively, the model cannot account for fact (iv) since in the model investors’ risk aversion does not
fluctuate. The model cannot account fact (v) quantatively because only one emerging economy is considered
here. Lizarazo (2012) extends the model here to the case of multiple emerging economies in order to study
this case. in doing so, Lizarazo (2012) can quantitatively account for the high correlation across sovereign
spreads of emerging economies that have financial links.
5The assumption of DARA preferences seems to be justified by the characteristics of the investors in
emerging financial markets. These investors are both individuals and institutional investors such as banks,
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds and insurance companies. For individual investors, it is straight-
forward to assume that these agents are risk averse. For institutional investors risk aversion may follow from
two sources: regulations over the composition of their portfolio and the characteristics of the institutions’
management. Regarding the first source, banks face capital adequacy ratios; mutual funds face restrictions
in their access to leverage against their asset holdings; and pension funds and insurance companies face strict
limits on their exposure to risk. Regarding the second source, for each class of institutional investor, man-
agers ultimately make the portfolio allocation decisions. These managers can also be treated as risk averse
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Because of this specification for investors’ preferences, they demand an excess risk pre-
mium in order to willingly take the risk of default embodied in the emerging economies’
sovereign bonds and this risk premium is higher for higher levels of risk. Additionally,
since investors’ preferences exhibit DARA, their tolerance of risk varies with their wealth
and their degree of risk aversion. Therefore, this model is qualitatively consistent with the
previously cited facts (i) to (iv), and if extended to a set up with more than one emerging
economy, it is also consistent with fact (v).6
In the quantitative part of the paper, the model is calibrated to the case of the default
in 2001 in Argentina and its results are compared to the results of a similar model of
endogenous sovereign default risk with risk neutral investors. In general, the model with
risk averse investors performs better at explaining the real business statistics in Argentina.
The current model explains the spreads of the economy much better than its counterpart
because it delivers higher average spreads with a higher volatility which is closer to the
observed data. Also the model delivers the observed correlation between investors’ wealth
(proxied by the SP500, as in the empirical literature) and the spreads of the economy. Like
the risk-neutral model, the risk-averse model can also account for the negative correlations
between output and trade balance, and output and interest rates; and both models account
for the positive correlation between interest rates and trade balance. On the downside,
neither model delivers sufficiently high average levels of debt.
The fact that the model with risk averse investors explains the spreads of the economy
better than its counterpart implies that the model is able to account quantitatively for facts
(i) and (ii): Approximately 21.62% of the average spread is due to the risk premium if the
constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 2, and 34.14% of
this spread is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the
investors has a value of 5.7 During turbulent times spreads are explained to a larger extent
by risk premium: Approximately 24.0% of the spread during the year before default is due
to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a
value of 2, and 56.9% of this spread is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk
aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 5. These risk premiums during the year
agents. Additionally, the remuneration—and therefore the wealth—of these agents is closely related to the
performance of the portfolio that they manage. These factors suggest that portfolio choices of institutional
investors will be consistent with the choices of agents whose preferences exhibit DARA.
6As previously noted, Lizarazo(2012) develops such a model.
7Since the average default probability of the model is very close for the model with risk neutral and risk
averse investors, and since the total spread for risk neutral investors is explained by expected losses, the risk
premium in the models with risk averse investors can be proxied by the excess spreads in those models in
comparison to the spreads in the risk neutral model.
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previous to default are 2.38% and 22.76% more than the mean risk premiums for the models
with risk aversion of 2 and 5 respectively. In other words, the sovereign risk premium is
counter-cyclical. This result corresponds to fact (ii). Since for sufficiently large levels of
investors’ risk aversion, the model exhibits the observed negative correlation between proxies
of investors wealth and sovereign spreads, the model can account quantitatively for fact (iii).
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 is the introduction; section 2 presents the
theoretical model; section 3 derives some predictions of the model and discusses the relevant
empirical literature that supports them; section 4 discusses the quantitative implications
of the model; and section 5 concludes. Two appendixes provide proofs of propositions
presented in the main text and the algorithm that solves the model.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 The Emerging Economy
There is a small open economy that is populated by identical risk averse households that
maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) (1)
where 0 < β < qf < 1 is the discount factor and c is the households’ consumption at time
t.8 The households’ periodic utility takes the functional form
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the households receive a stochastic stream of consumption goods, y.
This income is non-storable, its realizations are assumed to have a compact support, and
8In the model, because of the presence of uncertainty, and the functional form of the periodic utility
function of the emerging economy agents, in order to have an equilibrium stationary asset distribution for
the government of the economy, it is necessary to assume that the discount factor of the agents in the economy
is such that β < qf , where qf corresponds to the price of the riskless assets in the model – discussed later
in this section. For the same reasons, in order to have an equilibrium stationary asset distribution for the
international investors, a similar assumption will be necessary regarding the discount factor of international
investors βL (i.e.,βL < qf ).
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the stream of income follows a Markov process drawn from probability space (y, Y (y))
with a transition function f(y′ | y). Households also receive a lump-sum transfer from the
government.
The government of the economy is a benevolent government that aims to maximize the
lifetime utility of the households in the economy. The government has access to international
financial markets in which it trades one-period non-contingent bonds with a representative
competitive risk averse international investor. The government uses this access to financial
markets to smooth the consumption path of the households in the economy.
In international financial markets the government borrows or saves by buying one period
bonds, b′, at price q(b′, y,W ). Both the investors and the government of the economy
take as given the price function of the emerging economy’s non-contingent discount bonds,
q(b′, y,W ). In each period, the government rebates back to the households all proceeds
from its international credit operations in a lump-sum fashion.
Bonds of the emerging economy, b′, are risky assets because debt contracts between the
government of the emerging economy and the investors are not enforceable. At any time,
the government of emerging economy can choose to default on its debt. If the government
defaults, all its current debt is erased, and it is temporarily excluded from international
financial markets. Defaulting also entails a direct output cost.
Because the investors are risk averse, the bond prices of the emerging economy q(b′, y,W )
have two components: the price of the expected losses from default qRN (δ(b′, y,W )) that cor-
responds to the price of riskless bonds (hereafter T-Bills), qf , adjusted by the default prob-
ability of the economy δ(b′, y,W ) ,and an “excess” premium or risk premium ζRA(b′, y,W ).
This result will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.
Obviously when b′ ≥ 0, the probability of default, δ(b′, y,W ), is 0, and since the asset
is riskless in this case, the risk premium, ζRA(b′, y,W ), is also 0. Therefore the price of the
bond of the emerging economy is equal to the price of T-Bills which is qf = 11+r , where r is
the constant international interest rate. Only when b′ ≤ 0 can δ(b′, y,W ) and ζRA(b′, y,W )
be different from 0.
When the government chooses to repay its debts, the resource constraint of the emerging
economy is given by
c = y − q
(
b′, y,W
)
b′ + b, (2)
When the government chooses to default the resource constraint of the emerging econ-
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omy is given by
c = ydef , (3)
where ydef = h(y) and h(y) is an increasing function.
The timing of decisions within each period on the side of the emerging economy is as
follows: the government starts with initial assets b, observes the income shock y, and decides
whether to repay its debt or to default. If the government decides to repay, then taking
as given the bond price schedule q(b′, y,W ), the government chooses its next period asset
position b′ subject to the resource constraint. On the other hand, when the government
decides to default, all its assets holdings and debts are erased, and the government is
excluded from access to credit markets. Finally consumption of the emerging economies’
households, c, takes place.
Define V 0(b, y,W ) as the value function of the government that has the option to de-
fault. The government starts the current period with assets b and income y and faces the
representative international investor that has wealth W . The government decides wether to
default or repay its debts to maximize the households’ welfare. Given the option of default,
V 0(b, y,W ) satisfies
V 0(b, y,W ) = max
{R,D}
{
V R(b, y,W ), V D(b, y,W )
}
(4)
where V R(b, y,W ) is the value to the government of repaying its debt and V D(b, y,W ) is
the value of defaulting in the current period. In this model the value of defaulting in the
current period is a function not only of y, but also of b, and W , since if the government
defaults the investors face an asset loss of −b and their actual wealth corresponds toW +b.9
If the government defaults the value of default is given by
V D(b, y,W ) = u(ydef ) + β
∫
y′
[θV 0(0, y′,W ′) + (1− θ)V D(0, y′,W ′)]f(y, y′)dy′.
9It is important to comment that the fact that V D is a function of b does not imply that the government
internalizes its effect on the value of W ′, and as consequence in the value of V D(b, y,W ): Since default in
the model is not partial (the government either defaults in all its debt or does not default at all), if the
government defaults in the current period W ′ is exogenous; it only depends on exogenous variables like
the actual realized value of the investors wealth ϑTB = W + b, the exogenous probability for the economy
of re-entering credit markets, and the current level of the economy’s income y and its stochastic process.
Therefore, from the point of view of the government, given the state of the world today (that includes b,
and W , or in other words includes b, and ϑTB) the value of its outside option, V D(b, y,W ), is completely
exogenous.
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where θ is the probability that the economy regains access to credit markets.
If the government repays its debts, the value of not defaulting is given by
V R(b, y,W ) = max
{b′}
{
u(y − q(b′, y,W )b′ + b) + β
∫
y′
V 0(b′, y′,W ′)f(y, y′)dy′
}
.
Let s = {b, y,W} be the aggregate state of the model. For the government of the
emerging country, the decision of default/repayment depends on the comparison between
the value of repaying its debt, V R(s) , versus the value of opting for financial autarky,
V D(s). The repayment/default decision of the government is summarized by the indicator
variable d. In the context of this model, when the government pays back its debt this
variable takes the value of 1 and when the government does not pay back this variable has
the value of 0. The functional form of the default/repayment decision is given by
d =
{
1 if V R(s) > V D(s)
0 otherwise
}
(5)
This repayment/default decision is a period-by-period decision.
It is also important to note that the government faces a lower bound on debt B < 0
that prevents Ponzi schemes. This lower bound on debt B is not binding in equilibrium
(i.e. b′ ≥ B).
Following closely Arellano (2008), and conditional on the representative investor’s wealth
level W , the emerging economy’s default policy can be characterized by repayment and
default sets:
Definition 1 For a given level of wealth, W , the default set D (b |W ) consists of the equi-
librium set of y for which default is optimal when the government’s asset holdings are b:
D (b |W ) =
{
y ∈ Y : V R (s) ≤ V D (s) | W
}
. (6)
The repayment set A (b |W ) is the complement of the default set and corresponds to the
equilibrium set of y for which repayment is optimal when the government’s asset holdings
are b:
A (b |W ) =
{
y ∈ Y : V R (s) ≥ V D (s) | W
}
. (7)
Equilibrium default sets, D (b′ | W ′ (s)), are related to equilibrium default probabilities,
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δ (b′, s), by the equation
δ
(
b′, s
)
= 1− E
{
d′
(
b′, s
)}
=
∫
D(b′|W ′(s))
f
(
y′ | y
)
dy′. (8)
If the default set is empty for b′, then for all realizations of the economy’s endowment
d′ = 1, and the equilibrium default probability δ (b′, s) is equal to 0. In this case, it is not
optimal for the government to default in the next period for any realization of the economy’s
endowment. On the other hand, if the default set for b′ includes the entire support for the
endowment realizations, i.e. D (b′ | W ′ (s)) = Y , then d′ = 0 for all realizations of the
economy’s endowment. As a consequence, the equilibrium default probability δ (b′, s) is
equal to 1. Otherwise, when the default set is not empty but does not include the whole
support for the endowment realizations, 0 < δ (b′, s) < 1.
Associated with the default sets we can define two concepts, the maximum credit con-
straint and the maximum safe level of debt:
Definition 2 The maximum credit constraint is the maximum level of assets, b(W ), that
is low enough such that no matter what the realization of the endowment, default is the
optimal choice and D(b(W ) |W ) = Y .
Definition 3 The maximum safe level of debt is the minimum level of assets b(W ) for
which repayment is the optimal choice for all realizations of the endowment. In this case,
D(b(W ) |W ) = ∅.
Because the value of repayment is monotonically decreasing in b, it is obvious that
b(W ) ≤b(W ) ≤ 0. b(W ) and b(W ) are single-valued functions.10
Given W ′, any investment in the emerging economy’s bonds in excess of b(W ′) would
imply δ(b′, s) = 1. Since the default likelihood is one of the components of the prices of
the bonds of the economy, these investments will have a q(b′, s) = 0. On the other hand,
all investments in the emerging economy’s bond of an amount lower than b(W ′) imply
δ(b′, s) = 0. Because these investments are riskless it follows that q(b′, s) = qf .
10The stochastic process for the endowments has a compact support, and conditional on W , the value of
the credit contract is monotonically decreasing in b. Monotonicity of the credit contract and compactness
of the endowment support are sufficient conditions to guarantee that b(W ) and b(W ) are single-valued
functions.
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In this case, conditional on investors’ wealth W , the main results of comparative statics
of the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral international investors follow.
(See Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) Arellano(2008).) That is, default sets are shrinking in the
economies’ assets (i.e. if b1 < b2 then D (b2 |W ) ⊆ D (b1 | W )) therefore the probability of
default δ(b′, s) is decreasing in b′. Also, the emerging economy only defaults when it is facing
capital outflows (i.e. b− q (b′(s), s) b′ (s) < 0). Finally, conditional on the persistence of the
endowment process not being too high, the default risk is larger for lower levels of income.
Since the economic intuition of these results is identical to the intuition in the model of
endogenous sovereign default risk with risk neutral investors, it will not be discussed in
detail here.
It is worth mentioning that since δ(b′, s) is decreasing in b′, the risk premium ζRA(b′, s)
is also decreasing in b′. Therefore bond prices q(b′, s) are, as in the model with risk neutral
investors, increasing in b′. This result will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.
2.2 International investors
There are a large but finite number of identical competitive investors who will be represented
by a representative investor. The representative investor is a risk averse agent whose pref-
erences over consumption are defined by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) periodic
utility function with parameter γL > 0. The investor has perfect information regarding the
income process of the emerging economy, and in each period the investor is able to observe
the realizations of this endowment.
The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility from
consumption
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLv
(
cLt
)
(9)
where 0 < βL < qf < 1 is the discount factor of the investor and cL is the investor’s
consumption. The periodic utility of this agent is given by
v(cL) =
(
cL
)1−γL
1− γL
(10)
The representative investor is endowed with some initial wealth, W0, at time 0, and in each
period, the investor receives an exogenous income X.
Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can borrow
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or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here) by buying
T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of qf . The representative investor can
also invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economy which have an endogenously
determined stochastic price of q. As was mentioned before, this price is taken as given by
the investors.
The timing of decisions within each period on the side of the investors is as follows: The
investors start by observing their wealth, W , which is composed of their asset position in
T-Bills, ϑTB, and their asset position in bonds of the emerging economy ϑ, W = ϑTB + ϑ.
After the government of the economy decides on defaulting or repaying its debt, the investors
realize their gains/losses and their actual wealth is either W if the government has honored
its debt or W − ϑ = ϑTB if the government chooses to default. If the government has paid
back its debt, the investors choose their next period asset position in the emerging economy,
ϑ′, and in the T-Bills, ϑTB
′
. If the government has defaulted the investors choose their next
period asset position only in T-Bills. Finally, consumption of international investors, cL,
takes place.
Whenever the government of the emerging economy has payed back its debt the repre-
sentative investor faces the budget constraint
cL, ndef = X +W − qfϑTB′ − qϑ′ (11)
It is assumed that investors cannot go short in their investments with emerging
economies. Therefore whenever the emerging economy is saving, the representative in-
ternational investor receives these savings and invests them completely in ϑTB
′
. Therefore
ϑ′ = −b′ if the economy is borrowing, and it is equal to 0 otherwise.11
On the other hand, if the government of the economy is in financial autarky because of
default in the current period or past default without yet regaining access to credit markets,
the investor’s budget constraint is
cL, def = X + ϑTB − qfϑTB′ (12)
11This assumption does not seem to be inconsistent with reality. For example, mutual funds are strictly
restricted by The Investment Company Act in their ability to leverage or borrow against the value of securities
in their portfolio. On the other hand, hedge funds and other types of investors face no such restrictions.
Because of these regulations it seems reasonable to make the simplifying assumption that international
investors are able to leverage the riskless asset, ϑTB , but must have a non-negative position in the emerging
economy’s asset.
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The law of motion of the representative investor’s wealth is given by
W ′ = d′ϑ′ + ϑTB′. (13)
where d′ is defined as in the emerging economy’s sub-section.
Define V 0L (s) as the value function of the representative investor with an asset position
ofW facing a government with assets b and income y at the start of the period, which might
default.
Given the option of default, V 0L (s) satisfies
V 0L (s) =
{
V RL (s) if d = 1
V DL (s) if d = 0
}
(14)
where V RL (s) is the value to the investors when the government repays its debt, and V
D
L (s)
is the value to the investors when the government defaults in the current period. As said
before, if the government repays its debt the investors wealth is W otherwise they face an
asset loss of −b and their actual wealth corresponds to ϑTB.
If the government of the emerging economy defaults, the value of default to the investors
is given by
V DL (s) = max
{ϑTB′}
{
v(X + ϑTB − qfϑTB′) + βL
∫
y′
[θV 0L (0, y
′,W ′) + (1− θ)V DL (0, y
′,W ′)]f(y, y′)dy′
}
.
If the government repays its debts the value to the investors is given by
V RL (s) = max
{ϑ′, ϑTB′}
{
v(X +W − qfϑTB′ − qϑ′) + βL
∫
y′
V 0L (s
′)f(y, y′)dy′
}
.
The representative investor faces a lower bound on her asset holdings W < 0 that
prevents Ponzi schemes,
W ′ ≥W (15)
W corresponds to the “natural” debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994). Additionally, the
investor’s asset position in bonds of the emerging economy is non-negative, i.e. ϑ ≥ 0.
The optimization problem that the representative investor faces can be described as one
in which in each period, t, she optimally chooses her portfolio according to her preferences
11
in order to maximize her discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption, subject
to her budget constraint, the law of motion of her wealth, the no-ponzi condition, and the
condition that ϑ ≥ 0.
Because v(cL) satisfies the standard Inada conditions, and X is sufficiently large, cL > 0
always. Because the representative investor is not credit constrained (Equation (15)), when
the government does not default in the current period, the solution to the stochastic dynamic
problem for this investor can be characterized by the following first order conditions:
For ϑTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)]
f(y, y′)dy′. (16)
For ϑ′
qvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
f(y, y′)dy′. (17)
On the other hand, when the government of the emerging economy is in financial autarky,
the solution to the stochastic problem of the investor is characterized by the following first
order condition
For ϑTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)]
f(y, y′)dy′. (18)
Equation (17) highlights the fact that the endogenous risk of default by the emerging
economy—i.e. the possibility that d′ = 0 for some states of the world in the next period—
reduces the representative investor’s expected marginal benefit of investing in the emerging
economy. Everything else equal, this result tends to reduce the allocation of resources to
the emerging economy relative to the case where the emerging economy could commit to
repayment.
It is possible to manipulate equation (17) to get
q = βL
∫
y′
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
vcL (c
L)
f(y, y′)dy′.
= βL
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, d′
]
vcL (c
L)
+ qRN .
= ζRA + qRN . (19)
where qRN = qf (1− δ). Equation (19) shows the two components of the bond prices
of economies that trade financially with risk averse investors. The first component, qRN ,
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compensates the investors for the expected loss from default. The second component, ζRA,
corresponds to the risk premium that sovereign bonds have to carry in order to induce risk
averse investors to hold them. This term is the principal source of the differences between
the results of this model and the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral
investors.
The main determinant of the risk premium ζRA is the covariance term in equation (19).
This risk premium is different from 0 only when the covariance term is different from 0.
In turn, this covariance term is non-zero only for bonds with face value b′ such that the
government of the emerging economy finds it optimal to default on its debt next period in
some, but not all, states of the world, that is for bonds, b′, for which 0 < δ < 1. For these
bonds, the covariance term is non-positive: Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, d′
]
≤ 0.12 Since the covariance
term is non-positive, the emerging economy’s bond prices in this model are lower than the
prices that would be observed in a model with risk neutral investors even in the case in
which δ is identical in both models.
It is worth examining how ζRA responds to the variables in the model. First, asset pricing
theory implies that the more risky an asset looks in the eyes of the investor the larger its risk
premium, ζRA, should be. Clearly, from an investor’s perspective, an asset would seem more
risky the less tolerant of risk is this investor. As a consequence, ζRA is larger for higher levels
of γL, or for lower levels of W . Second, increasing the investor’s exposure to the emerging
economy’s debt should increase ζRA—even if the intrinsic riskiness of the economy’s assets
could be kept fixed when the economy’s debt level increases. The obvious explanation for
this result is that even with a fixed default probability for the economy, a larger exposure
to the economy’s debt would increase the riskiness of the investor’s portfolio, and therefore
should command a larger ζRA. Finally, increasing the riskiness of the emerging economy’s
assets (i.e. δ) should increase ζRA.
Leaving aside the behavior of ζRA, it is important to note that for any bond with face
12If for some bond b′ the government of the economy does not default next period in any state of the world
(i.e. the default set for b′ is empty), then d′ = 1 for all states, and δ = 0, Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, d′
]
= 0, and
q = qf . On the other hand, if for some other b′ the government of the economy defaults next period in all
states of the world (i.e. the default set for b′ includes the complete support of the endowment realizations),
then d′ = 0 for all states and therefore δ = 1, Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, d′
]
= 0, and q = 0. If 0 < δ < 1, then for
the states of the word next period in which the government of the economy repays [W ′ |d′=1] = ϑ
′ + ϑTB′,
and for the states in which the government defaults [W ′ |d′=0] = ϑ
TB′. Because [W ′ |d′=1] > [W
′ |d′=0] then[
cL
′
|d′=1
]
>
[
cL
′
|d′=0
]
and by concavity of v(·)
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|d′=1
]
<
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|d′=0
]
, as a consequence,
for b′ with more states with d′ = 1 vcL
(
cL
′
)
is lower. Clearly for this case Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, d′
]
< 0.
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value b′, the probability of default is higher in the case of a risk averse investor, δ(b′, s),
than in the case of a risk neutral investor, δRN (b′, s).13 Therefore, for any bond b′, the
component of the price that compensates the investor for the expected loss from default
is also larger in the case of risk averse investors. In conclusion, for s and b′ given, for the
emerging economy trading with a risk averse investor, the price of the bonds, q (δ (s, b′)), is
always lower or at best equal to price of the same bonds traded with a representative risk
neutral investor, qRN
(
δRN (s, b′)
)
.
From Equation (19), it is clear that if investors are risk averse, q(b′, s) depends not only
on the emerging economy’s fundamentals (i.e. y and b′), but on γL and W . In contrast,
in models of emerging economies that face risk neutral investors, the bond price of the
economy depends only on the economy’s own fundamentals (i.e, q(b′, y)).
The dependence of q(b′, s) on γL and W has an additional implication in terms of the
borrowing possibilities in the model. Having q(b′, s) depend on W reduces the response
of q(b′, s) to changes in b′ in comparison to that response in an otherwise similar model
with risk neutral investors. As a consequence, for relevant levels of debt (i.e., those for
which default is possible), the slope of q(b′, s) is less pronounced. Figure 1 illustrates this
point. As explained in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), the amount of borrowing observed in
equilibrium depends to a large extent on the steepness of the bond price function over the
levels of borrowing for which default is possible. If the bond price function is extremely
steep then the government would not borrow a lot because it internalizes the fact that an
additional level of debt raises the average cost of debt by the slope of the price function.
Therefore, in the risk averse model, other things given, because of its flatter bond price
function for relevant levels of debt, larger levels of debt might be supported at equilibrium
in comparison to the levels of debt supported by an otherwise equal model with risk neutral
investors.
2.2.1 Investor’s Credit Constraints
Whenever the representative investor faces credit constraints in international credit markets
then the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions characterize her optimization problem:
For ϑTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
− µ = βL
∫
y′
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)]
f(y, y′)dy′.
13This is the case because the value for the economy of participating in the credit market is comparatively
lower when the investors are risk averse.
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Figure 1: Bond Price Schedules as function of γL
For ϑ′
q = q∗ −
µ (1− δ)
vcL (c
L)
.
where q∗ corresponds to the bond price consistent with an interior solution for the rep-
resentative investor’s optimization problem, and µ corresponds to the multiplier on the
representative investor’s credit constraint.
Given that credit constraints for the investors increase their opportunity cost of investing
in emerging economies, other things equal, these constraints should reduce the equilibrium
bond prices of the emerging economy even further in comparison to the default risk adjusted
price (i.e. qRN ).
2.3 Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for this model is defined as a set of policy functions for (i)
the emerging economy’s consumption c(s), (ii) the government’s asset holdings b′(s), (iii)
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the government’s default decisions d(s) and the associated default sets D (b|W ), (iv) the
representative investor’s consumption cL(s), (v) the representative investor’s holdings of
the emerging economy’s bonds ϑ′(s), (vi) the representative investor’s holdings of T-Bills
ϑTB
′
(s), and (vii) the emerging economy’s bond price function q(b′, s) such that:
(i) Taking as given the representative investor’s policies and the bond price function
q(s, b′), the emerging economy’s consumption c(s) satisfies the economy’s resource
constraint. Additionally, the policy functions b′(s), d(s) and default sets D (b|W )
satisfy the optimization problem of the emerging economy.
(ii) Taking as given the government’s policies, and the bond price function q(b′, s), the
representative investor’s consumption cL(s) satisfies the investor’s budget constraint.
Also, the representative investor’s policy functions ϑ′(s) and ϑTB
′
(s) satisfy the opti-
mization problem of the representative investor, and the law of motion of the investor’s
wealth.
(iii) Bond prices reflect the government’s probability of default and the risk premium
demanded by the representative international investor. These prices clear the market
for the emerging economy’s bonds:
b ′(s) = −ϑ ′(s) if b ′(s) < 0 (20a)
0 = −ϑ ′(s) if b ′(s) ≥ 0. (20b)
This condition implies that the representative investor and the representative agent
of the emerging economy agree on a financial contract (b′, q) that is optimal for both
agents.
3 Default Risk and Investor’s Characteristics
This section focuses on the role that investor’s characteristics—wealth and risk aversion—
have on emerging economies’ access to credit. This section derives the implications (results)
of the model for the role of these characteristics in the determination of sovereign bond
prices, default probabilities, and debt flows of the emerging economies. Finally, the model
results are discussed in the context of the relevant empirical literature.
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3.1 Default Sets and Risk Aversion of International Investors
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, s, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the probability that the government defaults increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this model, the more risk averse are international investors, the higher is the de-
fault risk of the emerging economy and the tighter is the emerging economy’s endogenous
credit. The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward: To induce a very risk
averse investor to hold sovereign bonds, the government has to accept a very low price for
this bonds. However, other things equal, with lower bond prices incentives to default are
stronger. Therefore, for any given state of the world, δ(b′, s) is increasing in γL.
As δ(b′, s) changes, so too will the capital flows to the economy: For γ1L < γ
2
L, Proposi-
tion 1 implies that D
(
b | W ; γ1L
)
⊆ D
(
b | W ; γ2L
)
. Therefore
b
(
W ; γ2L
)
≥ b
(
W ; γ1L
)
.
b
(
W ; γ2L
)
≥ b
(
W ; γ1L
)
.
The maximum credit constraints for the government, b (W ), are tighter when interna-
tional investors are more risk averse—some contracts that are feasible with less risk averse
investors are not feasible with more risk averse investors.
3.2 Default Sets and Investors’ Wealth
Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all
W1 < W2, if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W2, then default will be optimal
for b for the same states y, given W1. Therefore D (b |W2) ⊆ D (b |W1)
Proof. See Appendix.
The investor’s wealth also affects the emerging economy’s performance. The intuition
for this result is simple: given some δ(b′, s), it is less costly in terms of current utility for
the investor to invest in the emerging economy when she is wealthy than when she is poor.
So keeping constant the degree of risk that the investor faces, any investment that she is
willing to undertake when she is poor she will also be willing to undertake when she is rich.
Intuitively, financial contracts available to the government of the emerging economy when
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the investor is relatively rich have to be at least as good as the feasible contracts to which
the government has access when the investor is relatively poor. Additionally, the previous
effect implies that the government of the economy faces stronger incentives to default when
the wealth of the investor is relatively low. Therefore δ(b′, s) is decreasing in the wealth of
the investor. These two effects amplify and reinforce each other. That δ(b′, s) is decreasing
in W implies that the economy’s bond prices q(b′, s) are increasing in W .
Proposition 2 also implies that for W1 < W2
b ( W 1) ≥ b ( W 2)
b ( W 1) ≥ b ( W 2)
In other words, the maximum credit limit that the government faces is tighter for lower
levels of wealth of the investor (b (W1) ≥ b (W2))—some portfolio investments that are
feasible when the investor is wealthy cannot be an equilibrium outcome when the investor
is poor.
3.3 Default as an equilibrium outcome of the model and Investors char-
acteristics
In the current model, in order to observe default it is necessary to have some b′ < b (W ′ (s))
for which by increasing its borrowing beyond b (W ′ (s)), the government is able to increase
its current capital inflows −q(b′, s, )b′. In what follows we limit the analysis to the case in
which the government’s incentives to default are stronger the lower the endowment.14
Definition 4 The conditional default boundary function, y∗(b|W ), corresponds to the en-
dowment level, y∗, for a given level of debt, b ∈ (b(W ), b(W )), conditional on the represen-
tative investor’s assets, W , such that the value of repayment and the value of default are
equal for the emerging economy: V R(b, y∗,W ) = V D(b, y∗,W ).
Conditional on the investor’s wealth,W , y∗(b|W ) divides the space {y, b} into the default
and repayment regions. From the previous discussion of the model, it is possible to establish
that y∗(b|W ) is decreasing in the government’s assets,b, and the investor’s assets, W , and
increasing in the investor’s risk aversion, γL. Using y∗(b|W ), the equilibrium bond price
14The incentives to default for the government are stronger when endowments are low as long as the
persistence of the endowment shocks is not too high.
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function, q(b′, s), can be written as:
q(s, b′ | W ′(s)) = qf [1− F (y∗(b′|W ′ (s)))] + βL
Cov
[
vcL(c
L′ (s)), d′ (s, b′ |W ′(s))
]
vcL(c
L (s))
=
Y∫
y∗(b′|W ′(s))
βL
vcL
(
cL
′
(s)
)
vcL (c
L (s))
f
(
y′ | y
)
dy′.
where F is the cumulative probability distribution of shocks.
Clearly since y∗(b′|W ′ (s)) is decreasing in b′, and ζ(b′, s) is increasing in b′, as debt
increases, q(s, b′ |W ′(s)) goes to zero. We define the endogenous borrowing limit b∗(s | W ′)
as follows:
Definition 5 The endogenous borrowing limit b∗(s | W ′) is the level of debt for which
pi ≡ −q(s, b∗(s |W ′))b∗(s |W ′) satisfies
pi = max
b′
[
−
(
qf [1− F (y∗(b′|W ′))] + βL
Cov[vcL(c
L′(s)), d′(s, b′ |W ′)]
vcL(c
L(s))
)
b′
]
. (21)
For any state s, b∗(s | W ′) is the endogenous borrowing limit because conditional on W ′,
for any b′ < b∗(s | W ′) then V R(s, b′ | W ′) < V R(s, b∗(s | W ′)), and b′ < b∗(s | W ′) cannot
be optimal.
Definition 6 For any state s, the relevant risky region of the model is limited to contracts
with b′ ∈
[
b∗ (s |W ′) , b(W ′)
)
.
The relevant risky region of the model is not empty and default is a possible outcome
of the time series of the model only if there exists some b∗ (s | W ′) such that b∗ (s | W ′) <
b(W ′). For such b∗ (s | W ′) to exist it is necessary that q(b′, s) does not decrease “too fast”
when b′ decreases.
Investors’ characteristics contribute to a non-empty risky region in two ways which have
opposite effects: First, from proposition 1, proposition 2, and equation (21), the speed at
which q(b′, s) decreases when b′ decreases is increasing in γL and decreasing W . This effect
implies that default is less likely to be observed at equilibrium for economies trading with
international investors that are more risk averse or less wealthy.
Second, for smaller b (W ′ (s)), there is a higher chance that there exists b∗ (s) <
b (W ′ (s)). Intuitively, because investors must be compensated in order to induce them
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to take some default risk, this risk imposes an additional cost of borrowing for the govern-
ment of the economy. For the borrower, the cost of borrowing beyond b (W ′ (s)) must be
paid over the total amount of resources borrowed, and not only over the marginal amount
of borrowing. Therefore, the larger is the base over which this additional cost of borrowing
has to be paid—i.e. the larger is b (W ′ (s))—the higher is the cost of default risk and the
lower is the likelihood that the government would ever choose to borrow beyond b (W ′ (s)).
As stated before, because of proposition 1 and proposition 2 b (W ′ (s)) is decreasing in γL
and increasing in W . This effect implies that default is more likely to de observed at equi-
librium for economies trading with international investors that are more risk averse or less
wealthy.
Because of the two opposing effects, it is not possible to establish analytically how the
equilibrium default probability responds to changes in γL or W . However, the numerical
simulations of the model performed here suggest no impact of W on the probability of
default, and some impact of γL. Specifically, the relation between γL and δ(b′, s) is non-
linear: for high and low levels of γL, δ(b′, s) is smaller than for intermediate values of
γL.
3.4 Comparison of the Model with Empirical Evidence
This section connects the main results of the model with the results of the existing empirical
literature on the subject of the determination of the spreads of sovereign economies.
Bond Prices In the model, bond prices of emerging economies have two components:
one part that gives a price to the default risk, and another part that corresponds to a
risk premium for the investors. The empirical literature on the determination of sovereign
spreads of emerging economies is consistent with this result. For example, using data on
credit default swap (CDS) spreads and default histories of rated bonds for 26 emerging
economies, Remolona et al. (2007) estimate expected losses from default and risk premia.
The authors find that the expected loss plays a small role in determining the spread and
that the risk premium plays a bigger role. Similarly, looking at 11 emerging economies for
the period 1990−2009, Broner et al. (2010) find that there is a positive risk premium which
is possible only if investors are risk averse. This result corresponds to stylized fact 1.15
15Using annual data of 24 emerging economies for the period 1970 − 2000, Klingen et al. find an almost
zero ex-post spread for emerging debt. This result is not inconsistent with the notion of an ex-ante risk
premium in sovereign debt; the result might be reflecting the short length of the period under study given
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Risk Premium In the model, the risk premium is more important for higher riskiness of
the economy’s bonds. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by
Cantor and Pecker (1996), Kamin and von Kleist (1999), Cunningham et al. (2001), and
Remolona et al. (2007). These authors note the fact that the proportion of sovereign yield
spreads explained by emerging economies’ own fundamentals is smaller for riskier sovereign
bonds than for investment grade bonds. Furthermore, Broner et al. (2010) find that the
risk premium increases with maturity. The 5 most volatile countries in their sample have
a higher term premium. This result implies stylized fact 2, that investors require higher
returns to compensate for higher riskiness.
Risk Appetite Proposition 1 establishes that capital flows to emerging economies are
smaller, and the spreads of the bonds of the economies are larger, when international in-
vestors are more risk averse. Much empirical evidence supports this proposition: using the
spread between the yield of three month T-bills and the US federal funds rate as a proxy
for market turbulence, Arora and Cerisola (2001) find that heightened macroeconomic un-
certainty in the US has a positive significant effect on sovereign credit spreads for emerging
markets. Using high-low yield spreads on US corporate bonds as a proxy for risk aversion
of US investors, FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Ferruci et al. (2004), Garcia-Herrero and
Ortiz (2005), Gonzlez and Levy (2006), and Longstaff et al. (2008) find that sovereign
bond spreads increase when the risk aversion of US investors increases. Mody and Taylor
(2004), Ferruci et al. (2004), and FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003) find that risk aversion of
US investors is an important determinant of capital flows to emerging economies: a higher
US high-low yield spread—interpreted as a reduction in investor risk appetite—results in
a reduced supply of capital to emerging economies. Finally, for a broader class of assets,
Broner et al. (2006) find that changes in the risk appetite of the investors affect portfolio
decisions and stock prices.
Investors’ Wealth Proposition 2 determines that the capital flows to the emerging econ-
omy are smaller and sovereign spreads are larger when the investors’ wealth is lower. Much
empirical evidence supports this proposition: For the period 1984 to 1993, Warther (1995)
finds that an inflow to corporate bond funds of around 1% of the mutual fund’s assets
results in a permanent increase of 2.1% in those bond prices. Using world and U.S. equity
indexes as proxies for the business climate (an increase in these indexes is associated with
the low frequency of the data and the possibility of over-representation of default in the sample during the
1970 − 1989 period.
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a better business climate), Ferruci et al. (2004), Gonzlez and Levy (2006), and Longstaff
et al.(2008) find a negative relation between economic expansion in the investors’ countries
and sovereign yield spreads of emerging economies. FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003) find a
positive and significant relationship between US output and capital inflows to emerging
economies. Finally, Mody and Taylor (2003) find that a higher growth in industrial produc-
tion in the US has a positive effect on the supply of capital to emerging economies. This
result is stylized fact 3.
Asset Returns Correlations Proposition 2 also implies than when the wealth of the
investors falls their demand for all risky assets in their portfolio should fall. If we think
of a world in which investors hold not only one emerging economy’s bonds but other risky
assets, and if the demand of the investors for these risky assets has an important impact
on the price of those assets, then other risky assets spreads should increase whenever the
emerging economy’s spread increases as a result of the change in the investors’ wealth.
This qualitative implication of the model is consistent with the findings of FitzGerald and
Krolzig (2003), Ferruci et al.(2004), and Mody and Taylor (2004): these authors establish
that emerging economies’ credit spreads are positively correlated with spreads of corporate
junk bonds from developed countries. This result is stylized fact 4. Furthermore, this
implication of the model is consistent with the findings of Valdes (1996), Baig and Goldfajn
(1999), Forbes and Rigobon (1999), Baig and Goldfajn (2000), and Longstaff et al.(2008):
these authors establish that sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies are highly
correlated. This result is stylized fact 5.16
4 Quantitative Analysis
The model in this paper is used to study the Argentina debt crisis and default at the end
of 2001. In order to highlight the specific contribution of risk aversion to the endogenous
sovereign debt literature, in this section the risk averse model will be compared to an other-
wise similar model with risk neutral investors. In this manner, the quantitative performance
of the current model will be directly comparable with the case of risk neutral investors.
16Regarding contagion across emerging economies sovereign markets, there is a large body of empirical
literature that presents evidence that financial links play a significant role in explaining simultaneous financial
crises and correlated spreads across emerging economies. See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Kaminsky et al.(2001), Herna´ndez and
Valdes (2001), Broner et al.(2006) and Hau and Rey (2008).
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The model is solved numerically at a quarterly frequency and its parameters are chosen
to replicate important features of the Argentinean economy and international investors in
emerging economies for the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4. In order to draw clear implications of
what considering risk aversion can add to the existing literature, some parameters are not
calibrated to match specific targets in the data, but instead are taken from the previous
literature on endogenous sovereign risk which looks at the Argentinean default.
For the Argentinean output, consumption, and trade balance, and for the U.S. output
and consumption, the source of the data is the IFS; for the yield of 3-months U.S. Treasury
Bills the source is the Federal Reserve Board; for the SP500 index and the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average index the source is Bloomberg; finally, for the interest rate of Argentina
the source is Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The data for the business cycle statistics includes
the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4 for all series except for Argentina’s private consumption. For
Argentina’s private consumption data is only available from 1993:Q1 on. Therefore, for this
variable the business cycle statistics corresponds to the period from the initial moment in
which it is available to first quarter of 2008. Output and consumption for Argentina and
the U.S., and the SP500 and the Dow-Jones indexes are seasonally adjusted, in logs, and
filtered with the H-P filter.17 The Argentinean trade balance is reported as a percentage
of the output. The interest spread is defined as the difference between the Argentinean
interest rate and the yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill.
4.1 Calibration
Table 1 gives the parameters which are considered in the numerical analysis of the model.
To make the comparison straightforward between the results of this model and the model
with risk neutral investors, most of the parameters for the emerging economy are taken from
the calibration in Arellano (2008). The mean income of the emerging economy is normalized
to 1; the coefficient of risk aversion of the economy is 2, a standard value considered in the
business cycle literature; the free interest rate is set to 1.7%, to match the period under
study with the quarterly US interest rate of a bond with a maturity of 5 years; GDP is
assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + ε
y with E[εy ] = 0
and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values estimated by Arellano(2008) for the Argentinean economy are
ρ = 0.94 and σy = 0.025, and the shock is discretized into a 21 state Markov chain.
17The Dow-Jones index is a price-weighted index of 30 blue-chip stocks from U.S. firms that are generally
leaders in the industry. The SP500 index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks that represent all
industries that is designed to measure performance of the broad economy.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Emerging Economy’s Mean Income E [y] 1
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.025
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.945
Emerging Economy’s Mean Income E [y] 1
Emerging Economy’s Discount Factor β 0.953
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2
Probability of re-entry τ 0.282
Representative investor’s Income X 0.01
Representative Investor’s Discount Factor βL 0.98
Representative investor’s Risk Aversion γL 0, 1
2
, 1, 2, 5
Risk Free Interest Rate rf = 1
qf
0.017
The probability of re-entry to credit markets after defaulting is set at 0.282, the value
chosen in Arellano (2008).18 The model with risk neutral investors targets a volatility of
1.75 for the trade balance. The discount factor is set at 0.953 which in the model with risk
neutral investors targets an annual default probability of 3%. Following a default there is
an asymmetrical function for the output loss that follows:
φ(y) =
{
ŷ if y > ŷ
y if y ≤ ŷ
}
(22)
ŷ is the only parameter of the economy that is not taken directly from Arellano (2008).
Following the strategy in Arellano (2008), ŷ is calibrated to target a value of 5.53% for the
average debt service to GDP.19
The parameters for the international investors are set as follows: the representative
investor’s discount factor is set to 0.98. The value of βL = 0.98 is one in the range commonly
used in business cycle studies of industrialized countries such that the asset distribution of
the investors is well defined given an international interest rate of 1.7%. It should be noted
that the results in this paper are not very sensitive to the choice of βL if this choice is in
the range of commonly used values in the real business literature.
18The value of this parameter is consistent with the empirical results in Gelos et al. (2011) regarding the
length of the period exclusion from credit markets of defaulting countries, however Benjamin and Wright
(2008) find much longer periods of exclusion.
19The value of ŷ varies with γL. For the case of risk neutral investors ŷ = 0.969, the value in Arellano
(2008); the calibrated values of ŷ for γL = 1
2
, γL = 1, γL = 2, and γL = 5 are 0.959, 0.967, 0.967, and 0.969
respectively. The debt service to GDP ratio of 5.53% cannot be perfectly matched because small changes in
ŷ generate large changes in the average debt level, and the average spread of the economy, with the changes
in the later being highly non-linear.
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The representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion takes five different values: 0,
1
2 , 1, 2, and 5, and the results of the model under these five values are compared. All the
considered values of γL belong to the range of commonly used values for this parameter in
the real business literature.
The representative investor receives a deterministic income of X = 1% of the emerging
economy’s mean income in each period. This parameter is included to preclude the investors
from not investing in the emerging economy in order to avoid a negative consumption level
in the case of default by the government of the economy. Potentially this parameter could
have important effects on the results of the model because it determines the borrowing
limit that international investors face in international credit markets.20, 21 Therefore, the
strategy for choosing X is to give it as little importance as possible by choosing a value that
is close to 0 and that still allows for interior solutions regarding the investors’ investments
in the emerging economy’s bonds. Overall, the numerical analysis of the model shows that
as long as X is not too large (i.e. X < 100% of the emerging economy’s average income)
the results of the model are not very sensitive to the value of X.
4.2 Simulations
The model is simulated for 20, 000 periods. From these 20, 000 periods, sub-samples that
have the economy staying in the credit market for 74 periods before going into a default are
taken to compute the economy’s business cycles statistics. This process is repeated 5, 000
times, and the cycle statistics are the average of the statistics derived from each of these
repetitions.
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 2. For any variable x, the label x
refers to the results of the simulations for the seventy-four periods previous to the default
episode; the label x− 4 refers to the results of the simulations for the four periods previous
to the default episode; x−D refers to the results of the simulations for the period previous
to the default episode.
As can be seen in Table 2, the proportion of the spreads of the economy and the volatility
of these spreads that can be explained by the model of endogenous sovereign default risk
20The natural debt limit faced by the investors defined in equation (15) is given by W = −X(1+r
f )
rf
.
21When X is large the portfolio choice of the investors is not very sensitive to W and γL, and the results
of the model tends to the results of the model with risk neutral investors. By affecting the leverage ability
and the availability of resources on the side of the investors, X plays a fundamental role in determining the
willingness to take risk by these agents.
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Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics: The Model and the Data.
Statistics Data γL = 0 γL = 0.5 γL = 1 γL = 2 γL = 5
mean (r − rf ) % 12.67 4.65 5.16 5.42 5.93 7.06
mean (r − rf )-4 % 22.26 7.13 8.07 8.61 9.38 16.54
mean (r − rf )-D % 29.93 11.45 8.26 10.36 11.49 29.66
std (r − rf ) % 5.42 3.70 4.27 8.45 7.38 8.78
std (r − rf )-4 % 13.59 5.77 3.37 7.05 7.39 12.97
mean (−(b/y)) % 53.30 5.92 5.88 8.11 7.21 4.95
mean (−(b/y))-4 % 3.26 4.07 5.36 4.78 3.40
mean (−(b/y))-D % 2.55 3.53 4.36 3.97 2.94
mean (−((1 + r)b/y)) % 5.53 6.05 6.07 8.40 7.47 5.13
mean (−((1 + r)b/y))-4 % 3.68 4.61 6.20 5.48 3.86
mean (−((1 + r)b/y))-D % 3.00 4.13 5.62 5.02 3.57
corr (y, r − rf ) -0.60 -0.31 -0.24 -0.18 -0.28 -0.32
corr (y, r − rf )-4 -0.90 -0.45 -0.39 -0.40 -0.48 -0.54
std (tb/y) % 1.83 1.47 1.14 1.21 1.34 1.10
std (tb/y)-4 % 2.11 1.31 1.38 1.57 1.57 1.19
corr (y, tb/y) -0.59 -0.43 -0.44 -0.54 -0.49 -0.47
corr (y, tb/y)-4 -0.85 -0.19 -0.13 -0.54 -0.11 -0.11
std (W ) % 14.79 N.A 0.40 5.41 4.77 14.68
std (W )-4 % 3.45 N.A 0.40 6.02 5.25 16.53
corr (W , c) 0.35 N.A -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03
corr (W , c)-4 0.21 N.A -0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.19
corr (W , r − rf ) -0.39 N.A 0.31 0.06 -0.08 -0.60
corr (W , r − rf )-4 -0.05 N.A 0.26 -0.07 -0.15 -0.06
Default Prob % 0.74 1.36 1.38 1.98 1.48 1.39
is increasing in γL. In the data, the mean interest rate spread is 12.67%. According to the
model, for the whole period, if γL = 0 the mean interest rate spread is only 4.65%, but if
γL = 2 the mean interest rate spread increases to 5.93%, and if γL = 5 the mean interest
rate spread is 7.06%. For the year previous to default, the mean interest rate spread in the
data is 22.26%. According to the model, if γL = 0 the mean interest rate spread is 7.13%,
but if γL = 2 the mean interest rate spread increases to 9.38%, and if γL = 5 the mean
interest rate spread is 16.54%. Also, for the period before default, in the data the spread
rises to 29.93%. The model predicts a spread for the period before default of 11.45% if
γL = 0, a spread of 11.49% if γL = 2, and a spread of 29.66% if γL = 5.22
The model is also more successful than its risk neutral counterpart at explaining the
volatility of spreads: The volatility of the spread in the data is 5.42%; for high values of
22In simulating the risk neutral solution, the model in this paper finds a higher δ and a lower r − rf for
the period before the default episode than those found for the same calibration in Arellano (2008). This
difference is likely the result of using a different solution method and a different dimension for the economy’s
asset position. As discussed in Hatchondo and Martinez (2006), models of endogenous sovereign risk are
sensitive to the solution method employed and how sparse is the grid for the asset position of the economy.
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Figure 2: Time Series of Interest Spread: 4 years previous to Default Episode.
γL the risk averse model over-predicts this volatility (i.e., if γL = 2 this volatility has a
value of 7.38%, and if γL = 5 this volatility has a value of 8.78%); while the risk neutral
model under-predicts the volatility with a value of 3.70%. For the year previous to default,
the risk averse model can perform much better: the volatility of the spread in the data is
13.59%, while if γL = 2 the risk averse model predicts a volatility of 7.39%, and if γL = 5
this volatility increases to 12.97%; instead the risk neutral model predicts a volatility of
only 5.77%.
The model with risk averse investors also better replicates the timing of the spreads of
the economy than the model with risk neutral investors: in the different versions of the risk
averse model the interest rate of the economy is high not only in the period immediately
before default but also increases substantially in periods of high economic volatility that are
not followed by a default (i.e. the year before default). In comparison the model with risk
neutral investors generates too little spreads at the tranquil periods and large spreads only
in the period previous to the default episode. Figure 2 illustrates this point by showing the
time-series of the interest rate spreads for the four years previous to the default episode.
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The model introduced here also reproduces the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic
interest rates. However, independently of the value of γL, the value of the correlation
predicted by the models here is lower than the observed value for the data of −0.60 for the
whole period and −0.90 for the year before default: If γL = 2, the numerical solution of
the model shows that the correlation between domestic interest rates and output is around
−0.28 for the whole period and −0.48 for the year before the default episode; if γL = 5
the correlation between domestic interest rates and output is around −0.32 for the whole
period and −0.54 for the year before the default episode. The alternative model with risk
neutral investors predicts values of −0.34 and −0.42 respectively.
The model also reproduces the counter-cyclical behavior of the trade-balance. In the
data, the value of the correlation is −0.59 on average and becomes −0.85 for the year
previous to default. The performance of the models here is similar: The results of the model
with risk averse investors show that the correlation between trade-balance and output is
around −0.47 for the whole period and −0.11 for the year before the default episode. The
alternative model with risk neutral investors predicts values of −0.43 and −0.18 respectively.
It is interesting to observe that the correlations between W and c and W and r− rf are
very sensitive to γL. Low values of γL generate correlations with the wrong sign.
By considering sufficiently high values of γL, the model is consistent with a few statis-
tics that the previous literature in endogenous sovereign risk cannot account for: First, the
model is able to match the negative correlation between a measure of the investors’ perfor-
mance, the SP500, and Argentina’s interest spread. In the data, the correlation between
these measures is −0.39 for the whole period, and falls to −0.05 for the period before de-
fault. The model with γL = 5 generates this pattern giving a value of −0.60 for the whole
sample, and −0.06 for the four periods before default. If γL = 2 the model predicts a value
of −0.08 for the whole sample, and −0.15 for the year before default.
Second, in the data, Argentina’s consumption and the SP500 are positively correlated at
0.35 for the whole period, and 0.21 for the year previous to default; in the model, if γL = 2
the correlation between investors wealth and consumption is 0.01 for the whole period, but
the value rises to 0.05 for the year previous to the default episode. If γL increases to 5,
this correlation increases to 0.03 for the whole period, and 0.19 for the year previous to the
default episode.
The table also shows that the probability of default of the economy is not a linear
function of γL. This last result points to the two previously discussed opposite effects that
γL has on the speed at which q(b′, s) decreases when b′ falls.
28
There are two important issues in which the performance of the model with risk averse
investors does not improve upon the performance of the model with risk neutral investors.
(The risk averse model does not do worse either.) First, the introduction of risk aversion does
not solve the issue of under-prediction of the debt-to-output ratio observed in the model with
risk neutral investors. Despite the flatter price schedule of this model in comparison to the
one in the model with risk neutral investors, the problem of low debt-to-output ratios cannot
be overcome quantitatively by a different specification of the preferences of the investors.
Instead this issue might be overcome by considering long term debt, domestic financial
institution’s and domestic firms’ borrowing needs, and domestic holdings of sovereign debt.23
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy the fact that for the periods of high volatility in the economy
(i.e. year before default and previous period before default) the trade-off between fitting
the spreads or the debt-to-output ratio of the emerging economy is less acute for any of
the versions of the model with risk averse investors than for the model with risk neutral
investors.
Second, the model with risk averse investors predicts lower overall levels of volatility
for the trade balance than the model with risk neutral investors. However, on the plus
side, the model delivers the correct timing for this volatility: while the model with risk
neutral investors has the volatility falling for the year previous to default, all the versions
of the model with risk averse investors have the volatility increasing for the year previous
to default.
4.2.1 Sensitivity of the results
Table 3 helps to understand the effects of some parameters on the equilibrium of the model.
This table shows the results of the model with γL fixed to 2, and ŷ fixed to 0.969, with
βL and X varying, and allowing for stochastic shocks to these two previous parameters
(βL(S),X(S)) to rf (rf (S)), and to the preferences of the investors v(·)(S).
The effects of βL are as follows: lower levels of βL generate a higher average spread and
a lower default probability, implying a higher average risk premium. However, the spreads
and their volatility for the more volatile periods (year before default and period previous
to default) decrease when βL decreases. Also the level of debt that can be supported at
equilibrium is lower with lower levels of βL. Finally, the correlation between W and the
23Models of endogenous sovereign risk that look at these subjects include, for example, Hatchondo and
Martinez (2009), Gennaioli et al.(2009), Guembel and Sussman (2009), Broner and Ventura (2011), Brutti
(2011), Mendoza and Yue (2011), and Sosa-Padilla (2011), Arellano and Ramanarayan (2012).
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Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics: Sensitivity of the results to other parameters.
Statistics βL = 0.98 βL = 0.953 βL(S) X = 0.1 X(S) rf (S) v(·)(S)
X = 0.01
mean (r − rf ) % 6.29 7.29 5.42 5.25 5.43 5.16 5.21
mean (r − rf )-4 % 7.99 6.29 8.89 7.76 8.94 6.37 9.94
mean (r − rf )-D % 12.28 7.32 17.30 12.05 17.42 7.81 24.48
std (r − rf ) % 5.78 5.78 5.31 4.88 5.31 4.37 5.65
std (r − rf )-4 % 7.03 4.58 9.26 7.02 9.29 4.45 11.54
mean (−(b/y)) % 3.97 3.76 3.65 3.63 3.63 4.24 3.62
mean (−(b/y))-4 % 5.50 4.59 4.20 4.16 4.17 7.65 3.54
mean (−(b/y))-D % 5.53 4.55 4.15 4.11 4.12 7.80 3.48
std (W ) % 6.92 2.51 0.33 8.00 15.90 0.77 0.36
std (W )-4 % 7.54 2.77 1.29 8.43 14.13 3.16 1.40
corr (W , c) 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.03
corr (W , c)-4 0.05 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.27
corr (W , r − rf ) -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
corr (W , r − rf )-4 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06
Default Prob. % 0.70 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.63 1.32 0.82
variables of the economy is smaller when βL is lower.
If βL is stochastic then the spreads and their volatility in the more turbulent periods
increase; also the correlation between W and the variables of the economy increases for
these turbulent periods.24
The effects of X on the equilibrium are as follow: higher X reduce the average spreads,
the volatility of spreads, and the debt-to-output ratio in equilibrium, and reduce the corre-
lation between W and the variables of the economy.
Again, if X is stochastic then the spreads and their volatility in the more turbulent
periods increase. Also the model can replicate better the volatility of W , however the
correlation between W and the variables of the economy does not change much (in relation
to the model with X = 0.1).25
When rf is stochastic, shocks to rf are common shocks to the economy and the investors.
24The process for βL is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of βL is
0.965, the variance corresponds to 0.2775%, and the autocorrelation is set to 0.8501. The calibration for βL
corresponds to the calibration of the process for the cycle of the US discount interest rate for the period
1983-2001, using that variable as a proxy for βL considering the existence at equilibrium of a tight link
between international interest rates and βL.
25The process for X is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of X is
0.425, the variance corresponds to 11.44%, and the autocorrelation is set to 0.5725. The calibration for X
corresponds to the calibration of the process of the cycle of the Dow index for the period 1983-2001. The
Dow index is used as a proxy for X considering that X represents other income to the investors not derived
from T-Bills or bonds of the emerging economy.
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In this version of the model, the spreads of the economy and their volatility are lower
than in the model with a deterministic rf . On the other hand, the debt-to-output ratio
increases despite the fact that the probability of default increases. When rf is stochastic
the correlation between W and the variables of the emerging economy is somewhat higher
than when rf is deterministic.26
Finally, when multiplicative shocks to the investors utility function are considered, the
effects on the spreads and their volatility are similar to the effects of shocks to X. However
in this case, the correlation between W and the variables of the economy is relatively larger
than in the model without these shocks.27
In general, the results of the model appear relatively robust to changes in the parameters
of the utility function of the investors or their budget constraint.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of default risk that
endogenizes the role of some external factors in the determination of small open economies’
incentives to default, sovereign bond prices, capital flows and default episodes.
The empirical literature on international finance presents evidence that points to a very
relevant role for investors’ characteristics—risk aversion and wealth—in the determination
of sovereign credit spreads and capital flows to emerging economies. The model in this
paper is the first model with endogenous default risk that can account for these empirical
findings. By relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality on the side of international investors
and assuming that the preferences of these agents exhibit DARA, this model generates
a link between international investors’ characteristics and emerging economies’ sovereign
credit markets.
Therefore, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the paper qualitatively and
quantitatively characterizes the role of investors’ characteristics in the determination of
26The process for rf is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of rf is
1.7%, the variance corresponds to 0.165% and the autocorrelation is set to 0.9125. The calibration for rf
corresponds to the calibration of the process for the cycle of 3-month T-Bills rates for the period 1983-2001.
27The process for the multiplicative shocks to v(·) is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states.
The mean value for the shock is 1, the variance corresponds to 8.92% and the autocorrelation is set to
0.6221. The calibration for these shocks corresponds to the calibration of the process of the cycle of the VIX
(volatility index) for the period 1990-2001, using that variable as a proxy for the changes in the tolerance
to risk of the investors and considering that the shocks to the utility function of the investors will modify
their ability to take risk.
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small open economies’ optimal plans when international credit contracts cannot be enforced.
Second, the paper presents a theoretical framework that is extended in a companion paper
(Lizarazo (2012)) to a multi-country setup to study endogenous financial links across coun-
tries with common investors. This extension can endogenously explain the occurrence of
contagion in sovereign debt markets of emerging economies.
Quantitatively, the model developed here outperforms previous models of endogenous
default risk in several ways. Compared to risk-neutral models using the same parameter-
izations, the current model performs better at jointly explaining sovereign spread levels
and equilibrium debt levels. In comparison to those models with risk neutral investors,
the present model supports a combination of higher levels of debt at equilibrium (at least
for the more volatile periods of the economy) and higher and more volatile spreads. The
model is also able to replicate the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic interest rates and
the trade balance. Finally, the model is consistent with the observed negative correlation
between measures of investors performance and interest rate spreads: this model exhibits
the expected negative correlation between investors’ wealth and sovereign spreads.
While the model improves on explaining the behavior of prices and quantities with
respect to models of the same type that do not consider investors’ characteristics, the model
is not without shortcomings. For example, if γL = 2 the maximum level of debt supported
at equilibrium is only around 7.21% of the output, which is much lower than the 53.3%
average reached by Argentina at the verge of default reported in Reinhart et al.(2003).
Also, from a computational perspective, the inclusion of an additional state variable (the
level of wealth of the investors) makes solving this problem much more intensive than the
simpler model.
Nonetheless the model presented here opens the door to an important economic issue—
that the creditworthiness of a country can be partially explained by factors other than the
country’s own fundamentals. Specifically, the consideration of risk averse investors explains
a large part of sovereign bond spreads and the behavior of borrowers and investors in
emerging markets.
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Appendix 1: Proofs.
The proofs assume permanent exclusion of credit markets after a default, therefore the value
function of default is independent of γL, and W . The quantitative analysis of the model
generalizes the results to the case of temporary exclusion. We focus on the case in which
the investor is investing in bonds of the economy so θ′ = −b′ > 0. More borrowing implies
a more negative b′.
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, s, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the probability that the government defaults increases.
Proof. Considering the case in which the government has not defaulted and assuming an
interior solution for the allocation to the emerging economy’s asset the first order condition
of the investor’s problem is
φ
(
ϑ′
)
= E
{
−qvc
(
cL
(
ϑ′
))
+ βvc
(
c′L
(
ϑ′
))
d′
}
= 0.
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where
Υ(ϑ′) =
ψ′ [v (c′L(ϑ
′))]
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, Υ(ϑ′) > 0 and Υ′(ϑ′) < 0.28
28The derivative of Υ(ϑ′) is given by
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The last inequality comes from the fact that both Υ(ϑ′) and ψ′ (ϑ′) are positive and
decreasing. The inclusion of these functions in the previous equation implies that φ2 (ϑ
′
1) is
lower than φ2 (ϑ
′
2) because Υ
′(ϑ′) and ψ′ (ϑ′) give little weight to the realizations of d ′ = 1,
and high weight to the realizations of d ′ = 0.29 Therefore φ2 (ϑ
′
2) > φ2 (ϑ
′
1) .
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given q and the risk of default (represented by the
expected realizations of d′, corresponding to the default probability δ) φ (ϑ′) is a decreasing
function, and as consequence ϑ′2 < ϑ
′
1 which in equilibrium implies b
′
2 > b
′
1.
Then for any s and taking as given q and δ, a higher γL would result in this agent allocat-
ing a lower proportion of her portfolio to the economy’s sovereign bonds. Therefore, when
the investor is less risk averse there are financial contracts that are available to the emerging
economy that are not available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently, given
q and δ then V C1
(
s; γL1
)
≥ V C2
(
s; γL2
)
.
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on γL, it is
clear that if for some s, default is optimal when γL = γL1 , then for the same s default
would be optimal when γL = γL2 . Additionally, because incentives to default would be
higher whenever γL = γL2 , than when γ
L = γL1 at equilibrium δ
(
s, b′; γL2
)
> δ
(
s, b′; γL1
)
,
and therefore q
(
s, b′; γL2
)
< q
(
s, b′; γL1
)
.
Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all
W1 < W2, if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W2, then default will be optimal
for b for the same states y, given W1. Therefore D (b |W2) ⊆ D (b |W1)
Proof. Because v(·) exhibits DARA v (W1, ϑ
′) is a concave transformation of v (W2, ϑ
′)
so if ϑ′1 is the optimal allocation when W = W1, and ϑ
′
2 is the optimal allocation when
W = W2, it is possible to define v1 (ϑ
′
1) = v (W1, ϑ
′
1) and v2 (ϑ
′
2) = v (W2, ϑ
′
2), where
v1 (ϑ
′) = ψ (v2 (ϑ
′)). The first order conditions of the investor are
φ1
(
ϑ′1
)
= E
{
−qv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′1
))
+ βv1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′1
))
d′
}
= 0,
φ2
(
ϑ′2
)
= E
{
−qv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′2
))
+ βv2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′2
))
d′
}
= 0,
29From the problem when γL = γL1 we know that E {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ
′
1)) + βv1,c (c
′
L (ϑ
′
1)) d
′} = 0. But since
ψ′ (ϑ′) is positive and decreasing then it weights the realizations of d′ = 0 more than the realizations of
d′ = 1 and Eψ′ [v1 (cL(ϑ
′
1))] {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ
′
1)) + βv1,c (c
′
L (ϑ
′
1)) d
′} < 0. Also since Υ′(ϑ′) is positive and
decreasing this function also weights the realizations of d′ = 0 more than the realizations of d′ = 1, and
E {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ
′
1)) + βΥ(ϑ
′
1)v1,c (c
′
L (ϑ
′
1)) d
′} < 0. Combining these results we have φ2 (ϑ
′
1) < 0.
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and therefore
φ1
(
ϑ′2
)
= Eψ′
[
v2
(
ϑ′2
)] {
−qv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′2
))
+ βΥ(ϑ′2)v2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′2
))
d′
}
< 0.
Υ(ϑ′) is defined as before, and as before the inequality comes from the fact that Υ(ϑ′) and
ψ′(ϑ′) are both positive and decreasing. Therefore φ1 (ϑ
′
2) < φ1 (ϑ
′
1) .
Again the concavity of V L (·) implies that given q and δ, φ (ϑ′) is a decreasing function,
and as consequence ϑ′2 > ϑ
′
1 which in equilibrium implies b
′
2 < b
′
1.
Then for any s and taking as given q and δ, a lower level of W would result in this agent
allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to the economy’s sovereign bonds. Therefore,
when the investor is more wealthy there are financial contracts that are available to the
emerging economy that are not available when the investor is less wealthy. Consequently,
given q and δ then V C1 (y, b,W2) ≥ V
C
2 (y, b,W1).
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend onW , it is clear
that if for some b in some states y, default is optimal whenW =W2, then for the same states
y default would be optimal whenW =W1. Additionally, because incentives to default would
be higher wheneverW =W1, than whenW =W2 at equilibrium δ (s, b
′;W ′1) > δ (s, b
′;W ′2),
and therefore q (s, b′;W ′1) < q (s, b
′;W ′2).
Appendix 2: Solution Method.
The state space of the model is discretized for the state variables of the model, b, y,W . y
is approximated with a discrete Markov chain with 21 possible realizations. b takes 300
possible discrete values. W , takes 10 possible discrete values. Interpolating over the grid
points on W , we allow a continuous range for W. The solution algorithm has the following
steps:
(i) Make an initial guess for the government’s value function, V 0 (s), next period asset
position, b′,0 (s), default/repayment decision d0 (s), and equilibrium price function
qAPC,(0) (s).
(ii) Taking b′∗,(−i) (s) , d∗,(−i) (s) and qAPC(−i) (s) as given, and assuming equilibrium in
emerging credit markets given by
θ′∗,(i) (s) =
{
b′∗,(−i) (s) if b′∗,(−i) (s) < 0
0 if b′∗,(−i) (s) ≥ 0
,
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solve the problem of the investor to find her value function V L(i) (s) and her optimal
policy functions W ′∗,(i) (s).
(iii) Solve the problem of the government to find its value function V (i) (s), its opti-
mal policy functions b′∗,(i) (s) , and d∗,(i) (s) and the new equilibrium price function
qEE(i)
(
s; b′(i) (s)
)
. This maximization involves the following sub-steps:
(a) Take qAPC,(−i) (s) and W ′∗,(i) (s) as given to compute c
(i)
L (s; b
′).
(b) Given c
(i)
L (s; b
′) and W ′∗,(i) (s), compute
A(i)
(
s, b′
)
= βL
∫
y∗(b′|W ′∗(i))
(
cL
′
)−γL
f
(
y′ | y,W ′∗,(i) (s)
)
dy′
(c) For any s, b′ solve for q(i) (s, b′) by solving the non-linear equation on q(i) (s, b′)
that is derived from (17):
q
(
s, b′
)−γL
− b′A(i)
(
s, b′
)
q
(
s, b′
)
− c˜
(i)
L
(
s; b′
)
A(i)
(
s, b′
)
= 0
where c˜
(i)
L (s; b
′) = X +W −W ′∗,(i)qf − b′qf .
(d) For any s, b′ given W ′∗,(i) (s) compute
β
∫
V C(i)
(
s; b′
)
f
(
y′ | y,W ′,(i) (s)
)
dy′.
(e) Maximize
u
(
y + b− b′q
(
s, b′
))
+ β
∫
V C(i)
(
s; b′
)
f
(
y′ | y,W ′,(i) (s)
)
dy′
with respect to b′ to find V C(i) (s) and the associated b′∗,(i) (s) and
q(i)
(
s, b′(i) (s)
)
.
(f) Determine d∗,(i) (s) by comparing V C(i) (s) to V D.
(g) Determine the equilibrium price of bonds by setting
qEE(i)
(
s; b′(i) (s)
)
=
{
q(i)
(
s, b′(i) (s)
)
if d(i) (s) = 1
0 otherwise
.
(iv) If
∣∣qEE(i) (s; b′(i) (s))− qAPC,(−i) (s; b′(−i) (s))∣∣ < ε stop. Otherwise, set
qAPC,(i)
(
s; b′(i) (s)
)
= qEE(i)
(
s; b′(i) (s)
)
, and repeat steps 2 to 4.
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